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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The topic of this master thesis is the need to regulate Corporate Groups at a national and 
international level, especially concerning the issues related with the corporate 
governance of these important economic operators. 
The choice of this topic fulfills my aspiration to evaluate the role of the Corporate 
Groups in the current economic reality. Actually, Corporate Groups have greater 
significance and importance in the national and international markets, and the current 
largest businesses are huge holdings that operate over the world under a whole group 
structure. In spite of this reality, the current corporate legislation of the majority of the 
countries has not been updated in order to handle with this new scenario.  
This gap between Law and reality is highlighted in particular when economic and legal 
problems rise by Corporate Groups, as has been demonstrated by the current crisis. In 
this context, the necessity of an efficient regulation of corporate governance is also 
evidenced.  
Actually, there have been several attempts to regulate Corporate Groups, in particular in 
the European Union. These attempts failed. Additionally, regarding corporate 
governance, auto-regulation has shown its shortcomings to deal with and protect all the 
interests involved in the market.  
Against this background, an effective regulation concerning Corporate Groups, giving 
particular emphasis to the corporate governance issues appears as an urgent subject that 
must be addressed.  
The intention of this master thesis is present a general overview about the concept of 
Corporate Groups, their treatment by some countries and the European Union, as well 
as the concept of corporate governance and its general current treatment. Throughout 
this presentation, the problems and improvable aspects of these concepts will be 
exposed and connected. In this way, the relation between the need to regulate Corporate 
Groups and to regulate corporate governance will be showing, trying to find a valid 
solution that conjugates all the issues involved in those figures, and provide a higher 




2. GENERAL REGULATION OF CORPORATE GROUPS 
2.1. General Considerations 
2.1.1. Concept of Corporate Group.  
In general, according to the majority of the doctrine of different countries, a Corporate 
Group can be defined as an organization of different and legally independent companies 
under a unitary economic direction that may also operate under an identifiable corporate 
image. However, Corporate Group is not a legal entity itself. Actually, the dualism of 
unit of decision vs. plurality of companies causes several legal issues and conflicts that 
will be duly pointed out hereunder. 
Corporate Groups are the privileged method of business concentration of the legal 
operators in order to achieve an optimum corporate size and deal with the 
competitiveness of the market, particularly in the case of large public limited 
companies. Moreover, international Corporate Groups appear as the best solution for 
several companies that want to operate in several countries with different legal and 
economic structure.  
It must be pointed out that there is not neither a unique definition of Corporate Group, 
nor a legal one, because Corporate Groups can be formed through several combinations, 
such as holdings, related companies or parent and subsidiary companies.
1
 Nevertheless, 
we may consider that the core elements of any definition of Corporate Groups are the 
following:
2
 (i) legal entity; and (ii) unitary economic direction. 
The element “legal entity” should be considered as a core element because each 
company of the group maintains, at least legally, its independence particularly with 
regard to its corporate bodies and estate. Consequently, from a strict legal perspective, 
each company of the group acts on its own name before their clients, employees, 
creditors, administrative authorities, etc. In this sense, in principle there are not neither 
“group´s creditors” nor “group´s debtors”.  
However, the essential element is the second one. In fact, a group of companies only 
exists if its members are subject both to a unitary direction and to a general strategy 
                                                          
1
 STRASSER, Kurt, Legal Models and Business Realities of Enterprise Groups. Pg 4-5 
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defined by the leader of the group. The unitary economic direction involves a common 
enterprise policy of the group that may affect one or more elements of the activity of 
each company (production policy, commercial policy, human resources policy). The 
different level of integration of the policies of the members results in different types of 
Corporate Groups (see below).  
Nevertheless, the existence of a common financial organization (capital requirements, 
dividends and reservation policies, distribution of resources, etc.)
3
 is pointed out as the 
minimal level of integration and unit of decision required so that a network of 
companies may be considered a Corporate Group. The existence of control (or its 
absence) will only affect the typology of the group but not its existence.  
2.1.2. Reasons to form a group 
Usually, the formation of a group results from an economic concentration process 
(vertical or horizontal) developed over a certain period of time. However, Corporate 
Groups may also result from the segregation of assets or by the incorporation of new 
companies with the purpose to diversify the corporate business activity. This being said, 
we may point out that the main reason to form a group is the rationalization of a certain 
economic structure with the purpose to respond to market demands over the time. 
This response may be focused on diversifying insolvency risks (in principle, the 
insolvency of one company will not prevent the other companies of the group from 
keeping doing their business on a normal basis), geographical risks (risks related to 
local economies and political atmospheres), etc. Other relevant reason is the level of 
specialization required in the production of certain products, activities and services; in 
these cases, the Corporate Group may provide the conditions to have a more flexible 
and decentralized administration inter alia with the purpose to be near of the relevant 
interest center. 
Other financial reasons may be related to the attraction of capital without losing the 
control of the main activity of the company (e.g. a subsidiary can be incorporated 
together with other minority shareholders) or the necessity of grating additional 
securities and guaranties to obtain bank financing or come up with a project finance. 
                                                          
3




Regulatory reasons also can induce to the formation of a group (for example, to make 
possibly to carry out some regulated activities). On the other hand, in multinational 
Corporate Groups, the necessity of complying with several and different local legal 
regimes usually leads to the incorporation of a group.
4
 
Despite Corporate Groups have led to abuses in some cases, the main and true reason to 
form a group is not necessarily to overthrow creditors, minority shareholders or 
regulators. As referred above, the issue is the necessity of a regulation that deals with 
the formation of groups and its undertaking in a modern and effective way, according to 
the current economic reality. 
 2.1.3. Types of Groups 
As mentioned above, there are different types of Corporate Groups depending on the 
origin and nature of the group. Therefore, we may highlight the following categories: 
(i) De Jure groups vs. De facto group
5
 
De Jure Groups are incorporated according to the relevant proceedings expressly set out 
in Law (for example, a group contract). Therefore, both the organization and the internal 
relationships of the group are automatically regulated by specific provisions set out in 
the General Corporate Law.  
By contrast, De facto groups are not formally formed as a Corporate Group, but they 
actually behave as a group, due to the existence of majority shareholders, shareholders 
agreements, personal unions, etc… With some exemptions (like, for example, 
Germany), domestic laws do not have any legal provision on the organization of the de 
facto groups, but doctrine and jurisprudence of different countries have dealt with this 
issue during the last century (see below). 
(ii) Control Groups, Contractual Groups and Personal Groups
6
 
                                                          
4
 MCCOURT, Alison, A comparative study of the doctrine of Corporate Groups with special emphasis on 
insolvency, pg. 2. 
5
 Classification based on the German and Portuguese Model, which legally recognized and define this 
classification of Corporate Groups. 
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Control Groups have a main company that manages or has the power to manage, direct 
or indirectly, the other companies of the group. Control Groups are considered Vertical 
Groups (see below). 
The existence of control is presumed in the following situations:
7
 a) when the dominant 
company possesses the majority of the voting rights of the dependent/subordinate 
company; b) when the dominant company has the power to appoint or remove the 
directors of the dependent company; c) when the dominant company is able to obtain 
the majority of the voting rights in the dependent company through agreements with 
third parties; and d) when the dominant company has appointed the majority of the 
members of the Board of Directors of the dependent company. In particular, the control 
will be presumed when the majority of the members of the Board of Directors of the 
dependent company overlaps with the members of the Board of Directors of the 
dominant company, or with the members of another dependent’s Board of Directors 
controlled by the dominant company.  
In the case of Contractual Groups, the unitary direction of the group is originated by 
contractual relationships between the main company and the dependents. These 
contractual relationships are very heterogeneous (for example, operational leasing 
services contract or enterprise management contract). Contractual Groups are 
considered Horizontal Groups (see below). 
Finally, Personal Groups are based on personal relationships. The unitary direction of 
the group exists due to the overlapping of the companies’ directors. Usually, this 
overlapping are related either to financial or familiar reasons. 
(iii) Centralized Groups and Decentralized Groups 
The number of competences that the leading company assumes in the group determines 
either the existence of a Centralized Group or a Decentralized Group. 
In this sense, in a centralized group the leading company manages all the competences 
of the other companies of the group leaving them without autonomy. 
                                                          
7
 PAZ-ARES, Supra 2, pg. 624: Concept of control following the presumptions established in the Section 




In a decentralized group the leading company only exercises the powers concerning the 
management of the group but it respects the autonomy of the subsidiaries with regard to 
the management of their own business (for example, concerning production or 
marketing). In this type of groups, the unit of decision is just applied in those issues that 
concern the entire group as a whole. Obviously, there is a minimum of decisions that 
must be taken under the concept of “unit of decision” so that we may consider that the 
group exists.  
This distinction is very relevant for the legal regime of the groups, particularly to 
establish an appropriate regulation for each case.
8
 
(iv) Vertical Groups and Horizontal Groups 
On one hand, Vertical or Subordinated Groups have a main or dominant company that 
controls the other of companies of the group (subsidiaries). There is a hierarchical 
relationship between the different companies of the group. This type of group has been 
more regulated by the Law and studied by the doctrine than the other types. Actually, 
the majority of the issues related to Corporate Groups are connected with this type of 
group. Vertical groups are usually are under the suspicion because it is likely that the 
subsidiaries act in interest of the dominant company instead of acting in interest of the 
group as a whole, particularly because the companies of this type of groups usually 
share and transfer assets and debts between them according to the most favorable tax 
and accounting regime, or use some companies of the group to allocate them the losses 
of the dominant company despite this fact may be inconvenient for the whole group. 
On the other hand, Horizontal or Coordinated Groups have a parity structure, 
established either by means of a shareholders agreement or a Corporate Group 
Contract.
9
 Each company of the group maintains its own independency and participates 
in the decision-making process in order to achieve a common policy. Sometimes, this 
type of groups has a higher decision body (composed by representatives of each 
company of the group) that has power to coordinate the common activities of the group. 
Therefore, the existence of a Corporate Group does not necessarily require a dominant 
                                                          
8
 EMBID IRUJO, José Miguel, El significado jurídico de los grupos de sociedades. La corporate 
governance. pg 87. This typology involves a basic perspective to interpret and apply the legal rules 
concerning Corporate Groups. Although it is true that the distinction between centralized and 
decentralized groups in the practice is not very clear.  
9




company. Actually, this typology of groups has been less analyzed by doctrine and 
jurisprudence (even in Germany, unless this typology is recognized in Aktiengesetz), 
because there is a common understanding that, in this case, the level of protection 
required is lower than in the case of Vertical Groups.
10
 Nevertheless, this typology is 
without any doubt a legitimate type of Corporate Group, provided that exists a unitary 
decision-making body for the whole group.  
 Unit of decision vs. Control 
As referred above in this section, there is a risk to restrict the concept of “Corporate 
Group” to the mere situation of control and, therefore, other type of groups may be left 
without any protection, particularly the horizontal groups.
11
 In this way, doctrine of all 
countries pays much more attention to control groups than to contractual or familiar 
groups. Consequently, it may create confusion about when we actually have a Corporate 
Group. For this reason, it is important to point out that the main element of a group is 
not the control of one company over another company. In fact, the main element is the 
unitary decision-making process for the group as a whole. The way to develop and 
implement this process may vary from case to case depending on the type of group we 
deal with. This unitary management must be continued, planned and stable.
12
 
The existence of control relationship between some companies can be a presumption 
that a Corporate Group exists with a unitary decision-making process; but a group can 
also exit when there is a cooperation relationship between some companies that reduces 
the autonomy of each company of the group to organize its own management and 
business. In these cases, as it is pointed out in the previous section above, the unitary 
management of the group is done in a horizontal way.  
 2.1.4. Lack of regulation of Corporate Groups 
The gap between the legal system and the economic reality of the Corporate Groups was 
already pointed out above. This gap results from the fact that Corporate Law has been 
traditionally configured for independent companies with autonomous governance 
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 EMBID IRUJO, José Miguel, Ante la regulación de los grupos de sociedades en España, pg 9. 
11
 RAMÍREZ OTERO, Supra 3, pg 632. 
12
 SANCHEZ – CALERO, Francisco Javier, De nuevo sobre la regulación de los grupos de sociedades, pg 
21. The author indicates that the Unitary Management is not performed with one only measure in a 





bodies and focused on its particular interests. This traditional regime did not change 
when Corporate Groups appeared and proliferated in local and international economies. 
Until now, both the doctrine and the jurisprudence of the majority of the countries have 
been closing and solving such legal gaps. In fact, only Germany and Portugal have 
developed a specific legal regime for Corporate Groups. Other European countries have 
not enacted a proper regime for Corporate Groups in order to deal with the economic 
relevance of this issue. Although there are some proposals of legislation, these 
proposals did not become statutory Law yet.  
Additionally, groups affect several different legal protected interests that are regulated 
by different areas of Law (such as Tax, Labor Law, securities and Antitrust Law). 
Consequently, there are several different approaches to the concept and nature of 
Corporate Group that may cause some confusion about Corporate Groups. In order to 
avoid any confusion or doubts, it would be advisable to agree on a general and common 




Corporate Groups need a specific regulation that covers the several particularities of this 
reality. Despite this regulation should be found within Corporate Law area, it needs a 
treatment independent of the general corporate rules in order to deal with the specific 
issues of Corporate Groups in a proper way. Nevertheless, as referred above, Corporate 
Groups touch other areas of the legal system.
14
 Therefore, certain provisions of other 
legal subjects must be taken into account in order to create a consolidated legislation 
concerning this topic.  
Regulation of Corporate Groups is not an impossible idea despite the real difficulty of 
achieving this purpose.
15
 In fact, some countries have regulated Corporate Group’s 
incorporation and organization. The practical application of these rules has not been free 
of problems, and it can always be improved. Obviously, we do not have to follow 
German or Portuguese regulation, but their experience lights up the way.  
                                                          
13
 In this sense, the Project of the Ninth Directive, and its finally failure in enacting a homogenous and 
general regulation for Corporate Groups proves the difficulty and challenge of this idea.  
 
14
Not only in a national perspective. Actually, Private International Law also deals with issues and 
problems arising from international Corporate Groups in the different areas of Law. PALAO MORENO, 
Guillermo. Los grupos de empresas multinacionales y el contrato individual de trabajo.  
15




 2.1.5. Different interests involved 
There are several different interests related to the existence of a Corporate Group either 
inside the group or outside (i.e. interest of third parties related to the group). 
Inside the group, there can be a tension between common interest of the group as a 
whole and the individual interest of each company member. Both these interests are 
valid and legitimate; thus, they should be protected.  
 (i) Dominant Company’s shareholders 
When the operational management of the main company is transferred to the 
subsidiaries of the group, the shareholders of the main company loose the control of 
their assets.
16
 This transfer of control may relevant issues when it affects to the core 
business of a company. In this case, the main company is changed into a holding and, 
therefore, its corporate purpose is affected. There is not a current change of purpose, but 
it becomes an indirect purpose. 
As a consequence, the decisions concerning the policy of capitals or the dividends 
policy
17
 may not be under the shareholder’s control. This control may go to the Board 
of Directors of the dominant company, who attends to the Shareholder´s Meeting of the 
subsidiaries with the majority of the voting rights. 
Actually, other situations such as mergers, divisions, partial divisions or transfers of 
assets are properly regulated and some mechanisms are established in order to protect 
shareholders and creditors of the companies. Nevertheless, there is a lack of regulation 
concerning other transformations that result in Corporate Groups which have the same 
result.  
 (ii) Subsidiary’s minority shareholders 
The protection of the subsidiary´s minority shareholders results from the breakdown of 
the subsidiary’s management autonomy. Despite they continue being legally 
autonomous, in fact they are managed by the dominant company. Subsidiary’s govern 
                                                          
16
 PAZ-ARES, Supra 2, pg. 628. Corporation Group´s structure erodes the power of the Shareholder’s 
Meeting in favor of the Board of Directors. 
17
 The Directors may retain the profits in the subsidiaries in order to not being distributed between 
dominant’s shareholders, and they may decide about the collection of funding and investment or loans 




bodies are devoid of content. Consequently, the interest of the subsidiary is clearly on 
risk to be subject to the group´s or dominant´s interest.  
Dominant´s interest is maximizing the profits of itself or the profits of the group, and 
minority shareholder’s interest is maximizing the profits of the company in which they 
invested into. Both interests are legitimate. Sometimes, both interests are correlative and 
simultaneous. Indeed, the group is formed usually to maximize the productivity of the 
holding, which benefits all the members of the group. Nevertheless, as it has been 
pointed out above, sometimes, those interests are opposite. In these cases, protection to 
minority shareholders is necessary. However, the protection should be higher in the case 
that the dominant´s interest is maximizing its own profits than the event that the 
objective of the dominant is truly maximize the profits of the group.
18
 The reason is that 
the interest of the group has to be also recognized as a legitimate interest.  
(iii) Creditors 
The patrimonial autonomy of each of the members of the group is also affected by the 
group policy. It is possible that transfers of assets, capital, activity, clients, or human 
resources occur into the group. Such transfers may be against the interest of one of the 
companies of the group. This fact could affect the legitimate right of third parties that 
have commercial or labor relationships with that company. 
2.2. International Overview 
As it was mentioned above, most of the countries do not have a specific general 




Additionally, two different approaches are followed by theorist regarding this topic: 
separate legal entity doctrine or legal enterprise doctrine. 
2.2.1.  Spain 
The main issue in the Spanish legal regime regarding Corporate Groups is the lack of a 
specific regulation. Additionally, the treatment of groups in the Spanish legislation 
                                                          
18
 PAZ-ARES, Supra 2, pg. 627. 
19




neither is systematic, nor homogeneous. Moreover, the concept of Corporate Group is 
fragmented and there is no a clear limitation of what constitutes a group. This fact 
reveals that there has not been a clear legal policy planning concerning to this topic.
20
 
For example, on one hand, in the Spanish Commercial Code and in the Spanish Capital 
Companies Law, the existence of a group is exclusively defined by the existence of a 
control situation. This control may be acquired by corporate ways or by another ways. 
On the other hand, in the Securities Market Law, the main characteristic in order to 
determine when we are facing a Corporate Group is the existence of a “unit of 
decision”. Obviously, there is a presumption that a unit of decision exists in all control 
situations. Nevertheless, the hypothesis of a horizontal Corporate Group is also 
provided. 
This dualistic approach to the concept of groups has fomented several studies and works 
by Spanish theorists. 
Additionally, other areas of Law regulate some issues related to Corporate Groups. For 
instance, Tax Law also defines the group as a corporate situation where one company 
dominates other/s dependent company/ies.
21
 Here again the control is the relevant issue, 
and the concept of group is limited to the vertical one. 
Spanish Labor Courts have also elaborated criteria to decide when a group exists in 
order to protect worker´s rights. In this sense, all the companies of the group might be 
responsible for the labor debts of one of them. From the labor perspective, the following 
circumstances presuppose the existence of a group: confusion of assets into the group, 
sharing of workers, exercising a unitary decision power, and creating a unitary 
appearance in the market. 
Consequently, there are several theorists that allege for a proper and necessary treatment 
of the Corporate Groups in Spain. The current economical crisis, which has affected 
                                                          
20
 RUIZ PERIS, Juan Ignacio, Los grupos en la Ley de sociedades de responsabilidad limitada. Valoración 
crítica de una regulación fragmentaria. pg 8 
21
 The concept of group for tax purposes is defined in the article 67 of the Spanish Corporate Income Tax 
Law: A company is supposed to domain other when it owns at least 75% of the social capital of other 





specially to Spanish economy, has revealed even further the necessity of regulating and 
giving an homogeneous treatment to Corporate Groups. 
In this context, the protection to creditors and minority shareholders of the subsidiaries 
is only provided by the general rules of Commercial Law. The parent company shall be 
liable for the subsidiaries’ debts, or shall have a duty towards the subsidiaries’ 
shareholders under general terms. For example, in cases of general tortious liability, 
cases of liability of the subsidiaries’ directors in fact, cases of liability of the director by 
right,
22
 cases when the parent company would secure the subsidiary, or general cases of 
liability for the piercing – veil doctrine. 
2.2.2.  Portugal 
Portugal is one of the countries that have a specific regulation for Corporate Groups. 
Taking its inspiration from the German model, Portuguese´s regime tried to fill in the 




Specifically, this regulation is provided in the Title VI of the Portuguese Commercial 
Code
24
 (hereinafter, “CSC”) under the general term of “affiliated companies”, which is 
subdivided into four different categories (see below). 
It must be pointed out that an affiliated company is a “strict legal concept”,
25
 not a 
factual one. We talk about an affiliate company only when the concrete case fits in one 
of the categories fixed by Law. Consequently, the problem of regulatory gaps is not 
completely solved. Additionally, this concept is only applicable from a commercial 
perspective, and consequently, other definition of Corporate Group can be found in 
other areas of Law. 
The mentioned four different categories are the following: 
 (i) Relationship of simple participation 
                                                          
22
 Article 367 of Spanish Commercial Code. 
23
 VENTURA, Raúl., Grupos de Sociedades – Uma introdução comparativa a propósito de um Projecto 
Preliminar de Directiva da CEE. 305-362.  
24








This type of relationship is regulated in the articles 483 and 484 CSC. It is considered 
that a company has a relationship with another one when it holds at least 10% of its 
shares and when between these companies does not exist another type of affiliation 
relationship (for example, a domination relationship).
26
 The last condition leads to 
unfair situations, such as the case in where two companies with relevant participations 
between them do not have to comply with the requirements of this typology because 
their affiliation corresponds to another typology.
27
 
In this type of affiliation, a written communication must be done by the tenant of the 
shares to the other, informing of the acquisition, and any eventual further purchases. 
Nevertheless, there is no sanction if this duty is not complied, which make this regime 
inefficient. 
(ii) Relationship of mutual participation 
This type of relationship is established in the article 485 CSC, and it concerns those 
cases where two companies hold at least 10% of shares reciprocally. This participation 
can be direct or indirect, and a relationship of domination cannot exist between the 
companies. In this case, the obligation to communicate also exists for both companies. 
The Law forbids the company that communicates the participation later in time to 
acquire more than 10% of shares of the other company.
28
 
In the event that this prohibition were infringe, the new purchase will not be void, but 
the excess of 10% of shares will not grant voting rights to the purchaser. Additionally, 
the directors of the acquiring company could be civil and criminal liable. 
(iii) Relationship of domination 
It is regulated under articles 486 and 487 CSC. This type of relationship exists when a 
company can dominate directly or indirectly another company. This domination is 
presumed when one company has the majority of the capital, voting rights or the power 
to nominate the directors or supervisors of another company.
29
 In these cases, there is 
                                                          
26
 ANTUNES, Supra 26, pg.14-17 
27 TRIGO, María da Graça., Grupos de Sociedades, pg 67. 
28
 ANTUNES, José Engrácia, Os Grupos de Sociedades – Estrutura e Organização Jurídica da Empresa 
Plurissocietária, pg 340; 
29




only a general duty of disclosure of the relationship in the annual accounts of both 
companies; and a general prohibition for the dependent company on purchasing 
dominating company’s shares. 
Consequently, neither rule concerning the protection of the autonomy of the dependent 
company, nor concerning the legitimacy of the dominating company to act in interest of 
the whole group against the particular interest of the subsidiary is provided in the 
Portuguese regime. This fact leads us to the general corporate rules concerning these 
issues, with the typical related problems. 
(iv) Relationship of group 
There is not a definition of group of companies, the Law only provides three different 
ways to create and organize a Corporate Group: 
a) The total domination (articles 488 to 491 CSC). This case 
happens when one company holds the 100% of other company. The total domination 
can be “initial”, based on the creation of a new subsidiary (exclusively decided by the 
board of directors of the parent company) or “successive” based on the purchase of an 
existing company (that requires the agreement of the General Meeting of the Board of 
Directors)
30
. Additionally, the Law provides a special regime that facilitates (and 
sometimes compels to) the full acquisition of the subsidiary company when the parent 
already owns at least 90% of subsidiary’s shares.
31
 
b) The contract of horizontal group (article 492 CSC). The Law does 
not provide any effect for this type of group. The integrated companies must remain 
independents and under a unitary direction. 
c) Contract of subordination (articles 493 to 508 CSC). This contract 
must be approved by a qualified majority of both companies, and put the relationship in 
a special legal framework.
32
 Under this contract, the dominating company could direct 
the management of the subsidiary in a disadvantageous way for its interest, with an 
adequate compensation. Additionally, the subsidiary’s shareholders could leave the 
company, and have the right to sell their shares to the dominating company, receiving its 
                                                          
30
 FRANÇA, María Augusta, A estrutura das Sociedades Anónimas em Relação de Grupo. Pg. 22.  
31
 Article 490 CSC: Acquisitions leading to Total Control (Takeovers) provision. 
32




value in cash or in dominating company’s shares. If they decide to continue in the 
subsidiary, they have the right to receive a guarantee annual dividend.
33
 
In order to protect subsidiary’s creditors, the parent company shall cover all annual 
losses of the subsidiary and shall be directly liable for the subsidiary’s debts if it does 
not pay them after being required to do so. 
2.2.3. Germany 
The German Corporate Groups Regime was the first to provide a specific regulation for 
the relationships between the companies that form a group. The German Stock 
Corporation Act of 1965 dealt with this issue as a result of the corporate concentration 
that was taking place in the first half of the last century.
34
 
German Law provides two categories of Corporate Groups, which can operate as a 
single enterprise, with a special protection of creditors and minority shareholders. 
Firstly, the Contract Group, which is regulated by articles 291 to 310,
35
 includes the 
control groups (when a company acquires the power to direct another company, even 
when it is detrimental for the controlled company but needed for the good of the group 
as a whole), or profit transfer agreements (when a company undertakes to transfer its 
entire profits to another enterprise). The agreement must be approved by three quarter’s 
majority of the shareholders of both companies (controller and controlled) in a general 
meeting. 
The contract must be in writing, registered and made available for the shareholders. 
Additionally, there are some protections for the controlled shareholders: article 304 
establishes the duty of paying an annual compensation to them, fixed by reference to the 
previous and expected profits. By contrast, in the event that the shareholders do not 
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want to maintain the controlled company, the parent company shall compensate them 
with shares of the controlling company, or with cash payment. 
In order to protect creditors, the Law establishes an obligation to cover losses of the 
controlled companies, without a requirement to prove a causal link between the parent’s 




Secondly, the Facto Group is also recognized under the articles 311 to 318 of the Stock 
Corporate Act, which try to maintain the independence of the controlled company and 
protect its shareholders and creditors. In these cases, the controlling company is not 
allowed to act in detriment of the controlled company, unless it compensates the 
financial loss in the same financial year. If the parent company fails to compensate, the 
controlled company can claim for damages. Additionally, the directors of the controlled 
company must prepare an annual report identifying the transactions and other relations 
with affiliated companies, and indicate if any compensation is due. Nevertheless, the 
level of protection in this type of Corporate Group is considered lower than the contract 
group´s one. There is a practical difficulty to identify each transaction between the 




However, it has to be pointed out that actually, the contract group has been little used. 
Most groups have chosen the facto group typology. The reason may be the burdens 




In addition, both regimes are only applicable to public limited liability companies 
(Aktiengesellschaft, AG). Consequently, the most used companies, private limited 
liability companies (Gesellschaftmitbeschränk-terHaftung, GmbH) neither are bound by 
those protections, nor legitimated when they form a Corporate Group. 
In these situations, after different approaches by the German Courts,
39
 the case Law 
established that the provisions for public limited liability companies cannot be applied 
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by analogy to the private limited liability companies. Therefore, the subsidiaries’ 
minority shareholders and creditors of the last type of companies are only protected by 
the general fiduciary duty of the dominant shareholders, the piercing – veil doctrine and 
the liability of the subsidiaries’ directors in fact. 
Finally, the German Corporate Groups regime is not the best example to be followed by 
Europe or those countries that have not a specific regulation for groups. Nevertheless, 
Germany has the merit to be the first one to regulate this issue, and can be used as a 
scheme (in its rights and wrongs) to start a new and improved system.
40
 
2.2.4. Common Law Countries. US and UK 
(i) United Kingdom 
UK is the most extreme example of the theory of independent legal personality of each 
company,
41
 based on a strong belief in the economy free enterprise theory, which 
refuses in principle any other regulation than the essential rules framing the perfect 
market. 
In this context, English Law does not have a special regulation for Corporate Groups. 
Furthermore, the topic was partially covered by the English Companies Act 1985
42
 and 
now it is covered by the Companies Act 2006.
43
 In particular, these Acts establish the 
criteria to consider a company as a parent company or subsidiary, especially concerning 
two issues: for accounting purposes and the duty to report the participation held in the 
subsidiaries by the parent’s company. Such criteria are: (i) holding the majority of the 
voting rights in other company; (ii) having the power to appoint and remove the 
majority of its directors; (iii) exercising a dominant position by a control agreement or 
by the Articles (legal control); (iv) having the power to exercise or exercising control 
over other company or manage it under an unified direction (factual control).
44
 
Nevertheless, out of the tax and accounting areas, courts are reluctant to admit the 
reality of interrelated companies acting as a whole enterprise. The governance of the 
groups is dealt by the general commercial rules. The most relevant rules that impact on 
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groups are those concerning the protection of creditors by mandatory disclosure rules, 
director´s duties and the oppression of minority shareholders; and the insolvency 
rules.
45




(ii) United States 
Due to political and historical reasons,
47
 United States has a traditional model of 
corporate Law based on the separate corporate entity and limited shareholder liability. 
Nevertheless, from the beginning of 20
th
 Century, when corporations were allowed to 
own shares in other companies, the economical reality started to change. Of course, 
Courts established some exemptions to the limited liability of the shareholders, in 






 was adopted by some rules and areas in US during the 
second half of the 20
th
 Century. In particular, the Regime for Securities regulates all the 
companies that are under the control of the regulated corporation. The purpose is 
obviously to protect the investors, but also to make the securities market safer. 
Labor Law has also adopted the enterprise analysis to protect the employees and labor 
union rights. In this sense, all affiliated companies are seen as a unique employer. 
Companies will be considered to be affiliated if: (i) an interrelationship of operations 
exists between the companies; (ii) the companies exercise a centralized labor politic; 
(iii) a common direction exists; and (iv) the companies are owned and managed by the 
same shareholders. 
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Additionally, Tax Law (to prevent tax abuses) and Jurisdiction Procedure Law
50
 also 
have some rules that deal with Corporate Groups as an only enterprise. These examples 
show how the enterprise doctrine has its place in the US jurisdiction, although the initial 
domination of the separate legal entity doctrine. Nevertheless, as happens in other 
countries, the fragmentary regulation, the different legal approaches that coexist in the 
economic reality and the lack of proper regulation about corporate Law, leave the matter 
in hands of courts. 
2.2.5. European Union 
The European Union also presents the issue of lack of regulation for Corporate Groups. 
The conscience of the necessity of regulating this phenomenon has been evident along 
last years, but without a clear success. 
More than 30 years ago, two Directives were drafted concerning Corporate Groups: one 
was concerning accounting aspects and another was concerning legal-substantive 




However, the second one, called the 9
th
 Directive of 1984 was never approved. This 9
th
 
Directive followed the German model, and tried to harmonize the regulation of 
Corporate Groups. It ended up in a failure. 
Additionally, the Law of the Societas Europaea (SE) of 2004
52
 was also insufficient: 
unless it mentioned some aspects related to Corporate Groups (such as the cross border 
affiliations, international holdings, or transferring assets), it did not include provisions 
establishing a proper regime for this figure.   
Therefore, the Phenomenon of the Corporate Groups in Europe was necessarily 
analyzed by the European Case Law of the ECJ. In particular, it was analyzed in the 
rulings concerning fundamental freedoms,
53
 as well as in the rulings concerning 
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taxation of corporate Law.
54
 In these rulings, the idea of harmonizing the corporate Law 
of the different Member States has been superseded by the statement of requirements to 
operate in a European Level (also regarding Corporate Groups). 
In addition to the failure to harmonize the general Corporate Group’s regime, the rest of 
regulations enacted were fragmentary, concerning different aspects related to this issue. 
For instance, accounting and auditing Law has developed several rules to European 
Corporate Groups (7
th
 Directive, 83/349; and the IAS-Regulation). There have been also 
enacted specific Directivesfor some special sectors, such as banks, insurance 
companies, or financial services companies.
55
 
The European Union has given up to the regulation of this issue as a whole, and the 
power to establish Corporate Group’s regime has been transferred to the Member States, 
under the subsidiary principle. This is the main idea of the Winter Report, (November 
2002),
56
 a report drafted by a group of legal experts, which sets out the guidelines of the 
regulation of the companies in the European Union. In this report, Corporate Groups are 
one of the main issues (jointly with the corporate governance). The Winter Report 
follows in some terms the proposals made by another group of experts (from private 
sources), the Forum Europaeum.
57
 The Forum focused mainly on the conflicts of 
interest and it did not use the German model as a standard. 
3. THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF GROUPS  
3.1. General Considerations 
3.1.1. Concept of Corporate Governance 
The term of Corporate Governance arose in the United States in the 20th Century, 
referred to the relationship between the Executive Directors of a public company and its 
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shareholders and Board of Directors.
58 
Since that moment, lots of definitions, doctrine 
and comments have been written over the world concerning this topic.  
There is not a unique definition of Corporate Governance. In this sense, the viewpoint 
of corporate governance depends upon which issues are being observed. Nevertheless, 
in general corporate governance usually covers the following topics:
59
 (i) The protection 
of shareholder´s rights, providing an effective system to redress and compensate them in 
the event of any damage to them; (ii) Ensuring the equitable treatment of all the 
shareholders, in particular minority shareholders; (iii) The protection of stakeholders’ 
rights; (iv) Duties, functions and liability of the Directors of the company, based on 
ethical behavior, diligence and loyalty; and (v) disclosure of relevant information and 
transparency. 
Those principles are applied in order to protect and promote the interest of the company. 
However, this interest is not always clear, in particular in Corporate Groups (see below). 
Under some circumstances, the purpose could be the maximization of the dividends for 
shareholders, but in theory, such interest should aim to the viability of the company in 
long term, as a social job-creating structure, related to its stakeholders and the 
environment (corporate social work).  
From a legal perspective, Corporate Governance is composed by Corporate, Capital 
Market and Labor rules concerning the distribution and control of powers between the 
governing bodies and their liability,
60
 in particular for listed companies. Nevertheless, 
Corporate Governance is also recommendable for companies not listed on regulated 
markets.  
Regarding Corporate Governance of Corporate Groups in particular, it has not been 
properly analyzed as an independent issue.
61
 We only can find some references to 
Corporate Groups in some of the Corporate Governance rules, for example in the Winter 
Report, the Principles of OCDE or the Spanish Aldama Report. These references are 
primarily focus on the disclosure and transparency of the structure of the group, and the 
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balance of the interest involved.
62
 Additionally, the liability of the parent company and 
its directors for the debts and acts of their subsidiaries must be analyzed under the 
corporate governance perspective as a mechanism to ensure the effective protection of 
the shareholders and stakeholders of the Corporate Group. 
Additionally, due to the deregulation trends in the 20th Century, the compulsory rules 
concerning corporate Law was substituted by soft Law and recommendations made by 
legal experts. This soft Law is based on the principle “comply or explain”.  
3.1.2. Formation of the group 
Just here a brief note to point out the relevance of the way chosen to form a Corporate 
Group in the future corporate governance of its member companies. As it was 
previously referred concerning the dominant’s shareholders interest (section 2.1.5), the 
formation of a group tends to limit the power of the parent’s shareholders and 
subsidiaries, and tends to transfer this power to the parent’s Board of Directors.  
This danger is especially relevant in the facto groups, where no formal agreement is 
made between the companies and the distribution of competences and organization of 
the group is not provided by any statute.The shareholders of the parent company are 
usually outside the sphere of decision-making to form a group because the way to make 
such formation does not need their later legitimating approval.The powers to purchase 
shares of other company, or to create a new company is usually exclusively in hands of 
the Board of Directors. 
By contrast, in the case of legal groups, it is usual the requirement of the participation of 
the parent´s shareholder, at least in the conclusion of the agreement or in its 
registration.
63
 This intervention does not guarantee the full future protection of their 
interest in the new formed group, but the conditions of the organization and governance 
of the group can be negotiated.  
3.1.3. The Group decision making 
 Disclosure and transparency of the structure of governing bodies.  
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The structure of the government of the Corporate Groups will depend on the general 
system of corporate management. For instance, the German model is based on a two-tier 
system, with a Board of Directors (Vorstand) and a Supervisory Board (Aufsichtsrat).
64 
In this system, the Supervisory Board has the power to appoint and revoke the 
Directors. 
By contrast, the Spanish model or the English model is based on a single-tier system, 
where the Management can be done by a sole director, several directors or by a 
collegiate body, but without a supervisory body. Other countries, such as France or Italy, 
allow the shareholders to choose between the two types of systems. Logically, the 
structure to make decisions in one and the other typology will be different. 
In any case, the control of the group will be in hands of the parent´s board of director.
65
 
The Meeting of Shareholders maintains its power appointing and removing Directors, 
ratifying or revoking appointments. This power can be exercise directly (in the case of 
the single-tier system) or indirectly in the case of the two-tier system (appointing the 
members of the Supervisory Body). Consequently, the Directors usually would manage 
the company according to the interests of the majority of shareholders. 
Additionally, under the General Corporate Law of all the countries, the General Meeting 
of Shareholders maintains some management powers, especially concerning the 
structural modifications of the company.
66
 In some countries, such as Spain or Italy, the 
General Meeting of Shareholders can increase their competences, always respecting the 
mandatory powers of the Board of Directors. By contrast, in Germany the powers of the 
Shareholders cannot be amplified by the Articles of the Company.   
Therefore, within the governing bodies of the Corporate Group exists a balance that will 
be more or less tipped towards the majority shareholders or the Board of Directors, 
depending of particular circumstances.  
In any case, in order to protect the different interests of all the shareholders, as such as 
the stakeholders, the relevant point concerning the corporate governance in both 
systems is the transparency and disclosure of the government structure.  
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In general, the disclosure provisions and transparency requirements usually refer to the 
listed companies. Nevertheless, these aims are desirable for all the companies, not only 
the listed ones. The group involveS too many interested parties that deserve the 
protection of a proper corporate governance of the Corporate Group. 
In the light of the recommendations of the OECD,
67
 the following information must be 
provided to any interested party: (i) the financial statements and annual operating results 
of the company. In the case of Corporate Groups, the consolidated accounts should 
provide a detailed explication concerning the solvency of every member company and 
the group as a whole; (ii) the company objectives; (iii) the majority share ownerships 
and their voting rights; (iv) the members of the Board of Directors, their formation and 
remuneration; (v) the related transactions, which is very relevant in the case of 
Corporate Groups; (vi) foreseeable risks, in the case of Corporate Groups, these risks 
shall concern every company member and the group as a whole; (vii) issues concerning 
employees or other stakeholders,which could affect the managing of the Corporate 
Group or its solvency; and (viii) any corporate governance code or policy adopted.  
As it can be observed, the disclosure of the structure of the governing bodies occupies a 
relevant issue in order to assess that a company is transparent. This information 
becomes even more important in the case of Corporate Groups, where the powers can 
be distributed and exercise more stealthily. 
Additionally, any control agreement, shareholder agreements, the relationships between 
the different companies that form part of the Corporate Group and the relationships 
between the different directors of the member companies should be disclose.
68
 
This information should be provided to all of the shareholders and investors of the 
Corporate Group, and should be included in the annual report of the company.  
 Corporate Group Purpose. Different interests involved 
The plurality of interests in the Corporate Groups, and the eventual conflicts between 
those interests are ones of the most relevant matters concerning this topic. Apart from 
the referred duty of the directors and companies to disclose their conflict of interests, 
                                                          
67
 Available at: http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdfpg 49. 
68




another issue must be analyzed in order to establish the rights, duties and liability of the 
parent companies and the directors: the legitimacy of the Corporate Group´s interest, 
and its prevalence over the subsidiaries’ interests.  
This issue raises the question of which interest must be considered as the corporate 
purpose of each member of the group. May the interest of a company be a different 
interest from its shareholder´s interest? Actually, the existence of a common and 
superior interest for the Corporate Group is recognized in some countries.
69
 
Nevertheless, this question, its limits and legitimacy must be clarified in order to 
establish a proper corporate governance regime for Corporate Groups.  
The conflicts of interest’s resolution should be established in the corporate governance 
guidance of the group. The directors need to know what interest they must be loyal to, 
and shareholders need to know what they can expect and require from the directors. In 
any case, Directors could never act against the Law or the subsidiaries’ articles.
70
 
Additionally, the interest cannot be seen only as the maximization of the profits of the 
shareholders. Other aspects must be taken into account, such as the long-term viability 
and the social purpose of the company.
71
 This approach has been verified by the recent 
scandals known during the financial crisis, which have reflected the necessity to respect 




3.1.4. Rights and duties of the parent company 
When the Corporate Group is formed, the parent company increases its size, its 
structure; and this formation can involve new rights and duties already mentioned, such 
as the disclosure duty and consolidated accounts. Additionally, it may increase its risk 
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sphere, in particular in those regimes where the Law establishes the liability of the 
parent company for subsidiaries’ debts.
73  
 
 In other cases, when there is not a mandatory liability of the parent company for the 
acts of its subsidiaries, such liability can be determined by the jurisprudence, based on 
the management in fact done by the parent company, or by the doctrine of corporate 
veil. 
In either case, these facts point out the need of the development of a corporate 
governance regime regarding the governance of Corporate Groups. The correct 
management of a company is essential in order to protect the interests of all 
shareholders and stakeholders.  
 Parent company as a de facto manager  
The de facto manager is the manager that effectively carries out the management of a 




The acts detrimental to the company made by managers in fact are not void, although 
they were not formally empowered to administer the company. The detrimental act 
continues to be valid and effective. Nevertheless, the managers in fact shall be liable for 
the consequences of their management in the same way of a manager in right. The 
liability of the managers in right comes from the European Law,
75
 and it is justified by 
the legal safeguard for commercial transactions. This legal safeguard cannot be broken 
by the existence of managers in fact, who are not published in the Commercial Registry 
and may be unknown for the stakeholders.  
The ideas referred concerning the managers in fact shall be applied to the case of 
Corporate Groups and related undertakings. A company can be considered as the 
manager in fact of a related company. In this sense, the criteria are the actual 
performance of the governance bodies, its accordance with the legal provisions 
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established by Law and Corporate Articles, and the level of integration of the 
companies. 
The management in fact is clearer in the case of vertical groups than in the case of 
horizontal case. Nevertheless, we must focus on the existence of a unit of decision, and 
if this unit of decision is exercised in a way that encroaches upon the powers of the 
dominated companies’ governance bodies, appearing in this way the dominant as the 
effective manager of the dominated companies. 
Nevertheless, the organizational nature of the decisions must be always analyzed. Even 
in the vertical groups, if a decision is done by the formal managers of a subsidiary under 
its autonomy power, the parent company will never be liable. If such decision is made 
following the instructions of the parent company, a distinction must be done: (i) if the 
decision is made following the organizational structure, that is, by the intervention of 
the parent´s shareholders in the subsidiary’s General Meeting, the manager in fact will 
be the parent company; (ii) if the decision is made by the parent´s managers without 
respecting the formal procedures, they will be the managers in fact of the subsidiary. 
Finally, to conclude, who acts as the manager of a company, independently of 
complying or not with the legal formalities, always has to comply with the duties and 
diligence due by the manager in right. These duties will lead to the eventual liability for 
the management that was effectively carried out.  
3.1.5. Duties and liability of directors.  
One of the principal purposes of corporate governance framework is the establishment 
of a successful duties and liability system for the directors. As stated above, the parent 
company of a Corporate Group or its directors, as the directors in fact of the 
subsidiaries, shall also comply with these duties, adapted to the special requirements of 
a Corporate Group. 
The general duties demanded to the directors are focus on the diligence and loyalty.76 In 
particular, a “diligent management” means acting as a prudent business person and be 
diligently up to date about the administration of the company. Additionally, certain 
qualification could be required or a minimum of time of dedication could be also 
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required.77 In this point is relevant to point out that a diligent manager should always act 
according to the Law and the Statutes of the Company. 
Diligence is linked to the other duty of the directors: loyalty. It is clear and undisputed 
that the director must act according to Law and Statutes, in the best interest of the 
company. In this point, the issue of what interest the director of a Corporate Group must 
protect appears again when the diligence of such director is analyzed.  
It has been deeply analyzed the loyalty duties of directors regarding the prohibition to 
take personal advantages of business opportunities, prohibition to use the company´s 
name to carry out personal interests, prohibition to compete, the duty to disclose 
conflicts of interests and duty of secrecy.
78
 In Corporate Groups, the main issue is not 
only the eventual personal benefit of the director. In Corporate Group the illegitimate 
benefit of a company taken from its subsidiaries may also be considered as a failure to 
comply with loyalty and diligence duty.  
When such benefit of the parent company must be considered illegitimate, and 
therefore, against to the duties of the directors of the subsidiary is not clearly 
established. This lack of regulation produces legal uncertainty in the way that it is not 
clear when the director can be considered liable for the damages caused by his acts.  
 Liability of the parent company for the subsidiary’s acts and debts 
The previous assessments, concerning the parent company as a manager in fact, and the 
duties and liability of the managers of the company, lead to the logical issue of 
considering the parent company liable for the acts and debts of the subsidiaries. 
This analysis has to be made both in regimes without Corporate Group’s regime 
(Spanish or English regime) and in regimes with a Group’s regulation (German and 
Portuguese regime). As it was exposed in the second section of this work, even in the 
cases of Portugal and Germany, due to the weaknesses of its regimes, Courts have to 
apply the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil and abuse of legal personality several 
times in order to make parent company liable for the acts of its subsidiaries.
79
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Additionally, Courts can apply to the extra contractual liability of the parent companies 
and the liability of the administrators in fact. 
Nevertheless, the liability of the parent company cannot be a general rule.
80
 A 
justification must exist in order to justify such liability, and an eventual punishment. 
Only in those cases where the parent company acts as an effective manager in fact, shall 
be bounded by the manager´s duties. In those cases, the parent company will be also 
liable if it does not comply with such duties. 
The consequences of these assessments are double: (i) the shareholders of the subsidiary 
have the chance to demand accountability for the damages caused to the subsidiary or to 
them; and (ii) the stakeholders of the subsidiaries may also demand for compensation if 
they are harmed by the parent company´s acts as manager of the subsidiary. However, 
the liability of the parent company shall not exclude the liability of the subsidiary. The 
managers by right of the subsidiary must also comply with their legal duties.
81
 In this 
way, the jointly shared liability shall be applied.  
 3.2. International Overview 
During the last century, corporate governance has been discussed and developed in all 
countries.
82
 In a general analysis, we can classify the corporate governance regimes into 
two groups: the American Corporate Governance and the European Corporate 
Governance.
83
 Some similarities and differences can be found between the development 
of each group and in the development of each country corporate governance regime.
84
 
3.2.1. Corporate Governance in United States 
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On one hand, the Anglo-Saxon countries created the idea of corporate governance and it 
turned into a reference for the rest of countries. The first concept of corporate 
governance was based on the mentioned principle of “comply or explain”. Nevertheless, 
the regime became stricter over the time, with the purpose to protect the investors and 
the society at large. 
In United States, the duty to disclose information regarding the financial transactions of 
the companies came to be compulsory.
85
 This change was due to some financial 
scandals, such as Enron or WorldCom. In this sense, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX)
86
 was enacted. This Act was the starting point of the compulsory disclosure 
concerning the corporate responsibility, relationships of the company with external 
auditors, financial information and intern control. The Act also established the 
punishments for the administrators that do not comply with such duties.  
Nevertheless, this new approach to the Corporate Governance received some critics: the 
high costs of the implementation of the control systems, the unfair global competition of 
other countries more permissive, the actual political reasons that motivated the 
enactment of the Law and the compliance cost for medium and small companies.   
Recently, the Obama Administration enacted the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010,
87
 that 
followed the SOX criteria, and the New York Stock Exchange published the Report of 
the New York Stock Exchange Commission on Corporate Governance on September 
23th of 2010.
88
 This report reviewed the principles of corporate governance under the 
light of the recent events. The principles concerning the structure and the role of the 
Board of Directors established the necessity of taking into account the specific 
circumstances of each company. In this sense, this issue is not susceptible to be ruled by 
mandatory regulations. Each company has to analyze its own situation, and determine 
the best corporate governance in order to “build long-term sustainable growth in 
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shareholder value for the corporation”.
89
 Additionally, it establishes that the board is 
accountable to shareholders for its performance in achieving such objective. In any case, 
the full disclosure of the structure of the board and the reasons of this structure is due by 
the companies, in the sense that was referred above. 
Nevertheless, specific rules or principles are not established for the corporate 
governance of Corporate Groups in United States. In this way, the general rules and 
recommendations are applicable to Corporate Groups, with the consequently lack of 
proper regulation for some specific issues mentioned above that affects to Corporate 
Groups. This fact is linked to the referred entity Law approach, followed by the Anglo-
Saxon countries. The rules and the principles are created under this approach, without 
taking into account the Corporate Groups. Later, some mechanisms are established to 
adjust the Law to the reality. The most important example is the doctrine of “piercing” 
or “lifting the veil”. This doctrine is used to deal with and establish the liability in 
exceptional cases, when the subsidiaries carry on the parent´s interests and not its own. 
These cases are individually analyzed and resolved, and this fact gives rise to a degree 
of legal insecurity. 
3.2.2. The European Corporate Governance 
Talking about a unique European Corporate Governance model is not easy because the 
corporate regimes of the Member States are different regarding issues such as the 
corporate structure. In this sense, as it was referred above, we can find in Europe both 
the monist and dualistic model of management. There are also different concepts of 
commercial enterprise, and the interest that should prevail.
90
 The European 
harmonization process has not reached some essential elements of the Corporate 
Governance, such as the obligations and liability of the directors or the exclusion of the 
shareholders. 
At the end of the 20th Century, the European Company Law was affected by the 
deregulation tendency. In this sense, different soft Law proposals and recommendations 
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were made. These recommendations highlighted the importance of the maximization of 
the shareholders’ value, but with a social perspective. The social mission of the 
companies began to be taken into account. In this sense, the United Kingdom, 
traditionally very close to American approach, enacted the Cadbury Report
91
 in 1992, 
that was focused on the defense of the shareholder´s value. However, Hampel Report
92
 
was enacted in 1998, which introduced the idea of corporate social liability in a long 
term. This idea was also reflected in the Spanish Olivencia Report.
93
 The scandals 
occurred in Europe at the beginning of the 21th Century confirmed the necessity of 
taking into account the medium and large term viability of the company, and the interest 
of the stakeholders, in the same way that happened in United States. 
During the nineties Corporate Governance Codes were created in each country. The 
European Commission assessed if these different codes could affect the Internal Market, 
and in this way, commissioned a study to analyze the necessity to harmonize such 
Codes in Europe: the mentioned Comparative Study of Corporate Governance Codes 
Relevant to the European Union and its Member States elaborated by Weil, 
Gothshal&Manges in 2001. The results of this study gave rise to the conclusion that lot 
of similarities and some differences exist between the Member State´s Codes, but in 
general, it is not necessary to harmonize these texts. The main similarities are the 
independency and leadership of the Audit Committee and the Advisory Committee. The 
differences are motivated for the differences in the regulation of each country 
concerning company regime 
Simultaneously, there was a concern about the necessity to achieve a legislative 
development of the European Company regime. After a failed attempt at approving the 
Takeover Directive in 1999, the Winter Report
94
 was created and later extended with the 
Winter Report II. This Report dealt with the Corporate Groups and the Corporate 
Governance, though in separate chapters. 
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Regarding Corporate Governance, the Winter Report recommended some measures, 
concerning the internal structure of the company, the market context and the protection 
of stakeholders, which later were introduced by Member States. These measures 
referred not only to internal structure of the company, but also to the market context and 
the protection of the stakeholders. In this way, it established that the Member States 
should develop the corporate governance codes, which the companies must follow or 
explain the reasons of not following such code.  
Between other measures, the Winter Report suggested: the duty to elaborate an Annual 
Corporate Governance Report by each company, informing about the control structure, 
the governing bodies structure, conflicts of interests and the rules concerning the 
corporate governance applied in the company; facilitating the attendance and 
participation in the General Meeting of Shareholders; the free off choice of each country 
between the dualistic or monistic model of governance; some recommendations 
concerning the director´s compensation; and the liability of all the directors for the 
information provided to the market.  
The Winter Report analyzed the Corporate Groups issues in another chapter, but some 
of them were related to corporate governance. In particular, it proposed some measures 
to increase the transparency concerning the structure of the group and the relationships 
between its members. The parent company should be the responsible for providing that 
information in a correct and truthful way. The Report also defended that the directors of 
a group could adopt a group policy that favors the group´s interest, even if it is against 
the particular interests of a subsidiary. However, mechanisms to protect stakeholders 
and to balance the rights of the different shareholders must be adopted. 
In 2003, the European Commission published the Action Plan on Modernising 
Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union,
95
 where 
deals with issues posed by the Winter Report. Additionally, exposed the convenience to 
create European Corporate Governance guidelines to take advantages of the Internal 
Market and improve the competitiveness of the European companies. Some of the 
objectives of this Plan were to provide an effective and homogeneous protection for 
shareholders and stakeholders in all the European Union, to increase the transparency, 
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and also, to encourage the establishment of a shared liability system for all the members 
of the Board of directors for “wrongful trading”. 
In the Action Plan there was also established the creation of the European Corporate 
Governance Forum,
96
 which has made a significant contribution to the development of 
the corporate governance in Europe during the last years. This impetus to the 
CorporateGovernance was completed by the Green Papers on Corporate Governance 
published by European Commission, in 2010 and 2011.
97
 
Recently, due to the current economic and financial crisis, the Commission published a 
new Project to elaborate a new Action Plan to modernise the European Company Law 
and corporate governance in 2012. This new Action Plan would have the following key 
points: (i) improve the transparency between companies and their shareholders 
regarding risk management policies, governing bodies’ structure and corporate 
governance policy; (ii) promote and facilitate long-term shareholder dedication to the 
company, in order to take power away the board of directors; and (iii) improve the 
framework for the cross-border operations. 
Compared to the American model for corporate governance, the European Corporate 
Governance Codes continue to be based on the general “comply or explain” model. This 
fact differs from the SOX in particularly, concerning the structure of the governing 
bodies, typology of directors, etc. SOX is focused on the compulsory disclosure of this 
information, while the European tendency is recommend the way that governance 
should be done. Nevertheless, the convergence of the requirements in both systems is 
very relevant. The majority of the requirements laid down in the SOX are also 
contemplated in the European recommendations. It is relevant here to point out the role 
of the mentioned Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 
this uniformity. Its principles establish the general guidelines that are followed by all the 
countries. Consequently, it can be assessed that the corporate governance is moving 
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relatively in a convergent direction. Nevertheless, the Corporate Groups issue is not 
properly taken up as a relevant and independent issue. 
4.  THE DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM  
4.1. Bringing the two mentioned issues (lack of group’s regulation and 
corporate governance of the groups) 
As it was exposed above, Corporate Groups dominate the current economic landscape. 
Most major businesses in the world are operated through Corporate Groups, not through 
individual companies.  
Faced with this reality, the Law recognizes the separate personality of each member of 
the group, but in the majority of the countries, the Law ignores the group structure 
within such companies operate. Even in those countries with a specific regulation for 
Corporate Groups, such as Portugal or Germany, there are some gaps in the regime. 
This gap between Law and reality leads to a complex set of problems and tensions both 
within and outside Corporate Groups.
98
 
First of all, several concepts and nature definitions exist even inside the local regimes. 
This lack of uniformity in the concept reaches its maximum in the global context. An 
international Corporate Group may be treated as a group in one country, and not as a 
group in another. These differences occur also inside the European Union. The lack of a 
proper legislation may produce legal uncertainty, and may facilitate abuses in the 
markets.  
Due to the economical crisis of the recent years, insolvency is one of the areas of Law 
where such gap has been more noticeable. Additionally, corporate governance failures 
have also been analyzed exhaustively as one of the causes of such crisis.
99
 In 
consequence, a relation between the Corporate Groups’ gap and the failures of corporate 
governance of the companies that operate in the market may be done. This relationship 
is confirmed by the Winter Report, which deals with both issues under the same text and 
the same spirit.  
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There is a gap of proper regulation for Corporate Groups that provides a correct 
framework to establish also a proper corporate governance regime for these groups. 
This gap is noticeable not only in each country, but also in a European and global level.  
To sum up, the two principal problems concerning the corporate governance of 
Corporate Groups are the following: (i) the transparency of the structure of the group 
and its relationships; and (ii) the conflict of interests between the members of the group. 
These issues deal indirectly with the protection of the stakeholders. It may have a direct 
effect on the creditors and minority shareholders. In this way, their protection might also 
be granted and improved by the establishment of a proper corporate governance regime 
for Corporate Groups. 
4.2. Transparency of the structure of the group 
The disclosure of some kind of information, such as the group structure, governing 
bodies’ structure or the relationships between the members of the board of directors of 
the group members is one of the main points to be taken into account when corporate 
governance of groups is analyzed. If disclosure of information is a relevant issue in all 
companies in order to protect minority shareholders, stakeholders and the market, in the 
case of Corporate Groups this disclosure is even more important. As recent scandals 
have revealed during the current financial and economic crisis, the opacity of this data 
might trigger a negative chain reaction in both national and global economy. 
Additionally, the disclosure of information related to transfers of capital, activity, assets 
or even human resources into the group is advisable in order to protect creditors and 
other stakeholders. However Corporate Groups are not created in order to commit 
abuses, the truth is that sometimes the internal transfers of capital may be the way to 
avoid responsibility towards the creditors.  
4.3. Conflict of interests 
The referred conflict of interests that occur inside the groups makes the establishment of 
a corporate governance regime for these enterprises even more difficult. In this case, 
there are more interests at stake than in case of individual companies. The protection of 
minority shareholders and third parties that is pursued by corporate governance regime 




of minority shareholders has to be extended to all the minority shareholders of all the 
subsidiaries, because the risk to illegitimately undermine their interests is higher within 
a Corporate Group structure. This fact makes more difficult, but also more necessary 
and relevant, a proper corporate governance regime for groups of companies.  
The difficulty of establishing the interest of the Corporate Group that has to be protected 
(an interest for the whole group, or an interest for each member of the group); and the 
failure to establish a clear rule to deal with eventual conflicts between these different 
interests may complicated the establishment of a corporate governance regime and a 
proper duties and right´s regime for the directors of the Corporate Groups. 
Consequently, the hypothesis of these directors being held accountable for the group´s 
acts and debts is left up to the case-by-case analysis.  
4.4. Failure of auto-regulation? 
Regarding the corporate governance, auto-regulation and soft Law has been the 
tendency to settle this topic, under the belief that this way of legislation would 
encourage the commitment of the companies to follow the governance guides. In the 
European Union, soft Law has also been the way to try to coordinate the different 




Auto-regulation is the possibility of the economic operators to adopt the general guides 
suggested by the authorities in this matter. These recommendations are called “soft 
Law”, since they are not compulsory. Nevertheless, as it was exposed above, some of 
these recommendations have ended up having legal effectiveness, since the non-
compliance of some rules might be punished.
101
 
This model of regulation was created in Anglo-Saxon countries.
102
 The expansion to 
countries of Roman legal tradition was due to the weaknesses of their system to deal 
with some problems, such as inappropriate governing bodies’ structure, or the abuses in 
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the remuneration of the directors. These issues are more severe in the case of Corporate 
Groups. Against this situation, the soft Law created some ethical and voluntary guides.  
The legitimacy and guarantee of the compliance of these codes is based on the 
procedure to create them. The codes or guides are written by experts, professionals and 
commissions established ad hoc to this purpose. It usually has also an image of 
neutrality and consensus, because the text is submitted to public consultation. The result 
is a text that is offered to the company to be voluntary undertaken. Before these codes, 
the companies must comply or explain.  
 Current failures 
Soft Law was conceived under the idea that the company was the first interested in 
complying with the recommendations, because this compliance would create a good 
reputation in the market. That is, the market would judge if the acts of the companies 
were or not according to the corporate governance codes. This utopian idea has been 
refused by the reality. The efficiency and utility of this system is not very high. 
For this reason, finally, the Public Authorities of each country had to promote and 
support the adoption of the soft Law by the companies. As it is indicated above, in some 
cases by enforcing some recommendations with compulsory rules,
103
 or by the 
obligation to indicate in the annual report the reasons to not comply with the 
governance rules, under the risk to be punished if the reason is not duly motivated.
104
 
Finally, regarding the hypothesis of regulating corporate governance by the contract of 
Corporate Group, the reality has also demonstrated (as happens in German regime) that 
the contract of group shall be improved itself. Currently, the majority of the groups are 
“de facto groups”. The contract of the group could be the best way to regulate some 
issues that affect the governance of the group, but until the date, this option has not been 
successful. 
 Current achieved success 
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Nevertheless, several positive points can be assessed of the soft Law concerning 
corporate governance. Firstly, thanks to the international development of principles of 
corporate governance, such as OECD principles, there is global homogeneity in the 
basic guides of all the countries. In a global market, this fact is very relevant, and it 
would be nearly impossible to achieve by compulsory measures.  
Secondly, soft Law is very flexible. The companies can always not follow the 
recommendations, if they motivate this not-compliance. In this way, the companies can 
adapt the guides to its own necessities, size of the company, the shareholders´ structure 
or the specific sector requirements. In this sense, over-strict and over burdensome rules 
are avoided by small companies. Additionally, the rules can change rapidly with the 
circumstances.    
Finally, companies are supposed to be more responsible and cooperative if they decide 
to follow or not a governance guide by themselves. The own company will establish its 
own objective regarding the corporate governance issues. Consequently, there is a broad 
support to the “comply or explain” approach, as it is demonstrated by the Study on 




5. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION 
5.1. Justification for regulation  
The proposed solution is the creation of a proper, coherent, and competitive regulation 
for Corporate Groups. This regulation should maintain the basic definitions and 
guidelines concerning corporate governance issues. The idea behind this whole essay is 
that company Law cannot deal only with individual companies, under and entity 
approach; and corporate governance cannot be only located in listed companies.  
There is no doubt that Corporate Groups exist and they are legitimate. In this sense, the 
exercising of a unit of direction, even the control by one company over the others is 
legitimate. Nevertheless, the exercise of this unit of direction must be ruled and submit 
to the good faith principles and loyalty duties of the shareholders and the directors.  
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Therefore, the needed regulation should articulate a balance between the unit of the 
group and the autonomy of the members of the group; and provide a balanced solution 
for the conflict of interests, the liability of the parent company and its directors for the 
acts and debts of the subsidiaries. Additionally, this regulation should provide a basis for 
the establishment of a corporate governance regime for this type of operator. The 
globalization of the markers is increasingly demanding a transparent and reliable 
environment. An appropriate corporate governance regime can bring benefits for the 
Corporate Group, such a good reputation in the market and a better knowledge of the 
own group, which allows to take better informed decisions.
106
 
In addition, the recent financial crisis has also shown the necessity to reinforce the 
regulation and supervision of the Corporate Group´s activity and governance, also in a 
European level. The use of simple solutions and the recurrence of lifting the veil 
theories in order to pursue accountability is not the most adequate way to deal with the 
problems that arise from the activity of Corporate Groups. A clear regime should be 
established in order to ensure the legal certainty.  
5.2. Different methods of regulation 
In order to establish a coherent Corporate Groups’ regime, an enterprise approach must 
be followed, moving away from the traditional strict entity Law. This change will reflect 
the current economic reality.  
Additionally, it is necessary to chose between regulate the Corporate Groups by the 
establishment of general principles and standards, or by the establishment of detailed 
rules. Under the point of view of the legal certainty and the protection of the different 
interests involved in the group, detailed rules would be more recommendable in order to 
deal with all the issues that arise with Corporate Groups’ existence and operations. 
Nevertheless, the figure of the Corporate Groups would rather not admit a strict legal 
regime because they have highly complex and very different types of organization and 
structure. In this sense, the regulation by principles, without dealing with very specific 
issues appears as the best solution in order to achieve a flexible regulation, adequate to 
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the current fast-changing economic reality.
107
 This flexibility should also be reflected in 
the balance between mandatory rules and autonomy of the companies. 
5.2.1. Balance between mandatory rules and autonomy of the companies. 
The proposed solution is a balance between mandatory and voluntary rules. Mandatory 
guidelines and principles shall be settled, and the Corporate Groups shall develop those 
rules according to their concrete circumstances by voluntary rules. On one hand, as it 
was mentioned above, auto-regulation has failed in its practical application. On the 
other hand, mandatory and detailed regulation concerning Corporate Groups leaves 
many gaps concerning the cases that fall outside the scope of the scenarios envisaged in 
the Law.
108
 Consequently, a flexible regime that combines both models of regulation 
may be the solution. 
The regulation of the Corporate Groups is in the field of the Private Law, and then the 
party autonomy principle should have a relevant place in this matter. This party 
autonomy shall develop into the limits of the legal guidelines established by Law. The 
advantages of this approach will lead to a higher transparency of the structure and 
relationships into the group, by the incorporation and disclosure of the contract of 
group. The governance of the Corporate Group under this scheme will provide an image 
of seriousness.  
Nevertheless, in order to protect the legitimate interests those are affected in the 
incorporation of a group, and because of demonstrated failures of the exclusively 
voluntary rules, some mandatory principles must be established by Law, with an 
appropriate control system and disciplinary regime that contemplates the eventual 
infringement of this regime.  
5.2.2. Distribution of competences between interested parties.  
Firstly, the regulation should avoid the two extremes: nor granting an absolute priority 
to the group´s interest to the detriment of the member companies, neither only 
recognizing the interest of each individual company, overlooking the legitimate interest 
of the group. Therefore, it will be necessary to respect the interest of the group, and the 
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legitimacy of the instructions of the parent company managing the group according to 
such interest, with the necessary protection and compensation (if appropriate) to the 
subsidiaries. The corporate governance of the groups and the general legal regime for 
groups should provide the solution for the referred conflict of interests.  
The group should be incorporated by an agreement, which should be approved by all the 
member companies by a mechanism similar to the corporate structural changes, with the 
protective measures for minority shareholders. If the group already existed and was 
formed by other mechanism, the later redaction of the contract of group should be 
bound by the Law. This contract would declare the existence of the group, and would 
provide the transparency and external control that require this reality.  
In this sense, in the incorporation of a Corporate Group, the distribution of competences 
and the way to govern the group must be provided. The distribution of the decision-
making competences should protect the interests of the group and also include a greater 
or lesser individual autonomy of the member companies. The regime should provide 
enough protective measures for the member companies, its shareholders and 
stakeholders, but without undermining the economic operation unit of the group. To this 
purpose, minimal adequate compensation measures should be established by Law.  
The General Meeting of Shareholders of the parent company should be granted with the 
power to modify the legal and economic structure of the group. In this way, the General 
Meeting should be the only managing body entitled to change the purpose of the group, 
and make structural and organizational changes into the group. The directors of the 
parent company should legally hold on the power to exercise the unit of direction of the 
group, with consequences in terms on liability.  
Additionally, protection, information and voice rights, jointly with compensation 
measures should be granted to minority shareholders and subsidiaries’ shareholders. The 
protection of stakeholders should be established by a liability regime laid down in the 
contract of the group. In this sense, in the contract should be clearly established and 
divided the responsibilities of the different members and managers, according to the 
structure of the group. Obviously, a centralized group cannot have the same liability 




left unprotected, under penalty of jointly shared responsibility of all of the members 
established by Law. 
When groups were established by Law, they would acquire the advantages of the 
Corporate Group’s regime, but also the responsibilities. The current liability of directors 
in fact, established by the case Law with some legal uncertainty would lead to a safer 
legal trade. In this sense, the governance regime for groups could establish a clearer list 
of duties and rights.  
Under the organizational point of view, some mechanisms should be provided in order 
to facilitate the communication between the members of the groups and set a transparent 
structure. This is the needed structure to achieve fair agreements into the group that give 
security to shareholders and stakeholders. In addition, the disclosure of such structure 
and agreements must be mandatory by Law.  
All these issues should be provided in a contract of group. This contract should be 
registered and available for the market. Here, we are opting for the contractual group 
typology. In order to promote the legalization, registration and disclosure of the 
Corporate Groups, the factual groups should be discouraged, in the way of acquiring the 
liabilities but not the advantages of Corporate Groups’ regime.  
The legal mandatory guidelines and principles should establish the framework for the 
group´s regime, and later, the Corporate Group chooses the better structure for its 
activity, lays down into the contract of the group its own corporate governance regime 
jointly. This will be the best way to recognize and regulate the reality of Corporate 
Groups and at the same time, protect all the interested parties and the market.  
5.3. Possible direction to be taken by national regulations and by European 
Regulation 
As is settled above, the states should regulate Corporate Groups as an independent 
matter, outside the general corporate Law. The reality has shown that the Corporate 
Groups present specific characteristics and problems that deserve a specific regulation. 
Additionally, this regulation should recognize the legitimate interest of the group, which 




In this sense, those countries that have not regulated or even deny the existence of 
Corporate Groups as legal enterprises, could take example from the German and 
Portuguese regime. Nevertheless, these regimes are not perfect. They create some gaps 
that need be fulfilled by flexible rules. In this sense, the balance between mandatory and 
voluntary and flexible rules is the most recommendable.  
The alleged regime should include specifically more mandatory principles concerning 
the corporate governance of groups of companies. The contract of group would be a 
good instrument for the good governance of the group, if some compulsory issues were 
included in it, such as the transparency of the structure of the group, solutions to the 
conflicts of interests into the group, the distribution of rights and duties between the 
members and managers of the group or the duty to motivate the intra-groups 
agreements. This approach would set aside the principle “comply or explain”. The only 
alternative should be to comply with the compulsory guidelines and explain the content 
and reasons of the specific rules voluntary laid down in the contract of group.  
In a European Level, as it was pointed out above, the European Union has given up to 
regulate this issue. Nevertheless, the European Union should recognize in a binding text 
the legitimacy of the interests of the groups and establish some standards applicable in 
all the internal market concerning Corporate Groups. This could be the first step 
towards a homogeneous treatment of the Corporate Group issues in all the Member 
States. This point is relevant since lots of Corporate Groups are international and 
operates in several countries. Later, the Member States should develop and implement 
these principles and standards in the terms pointed out above. In this sense, the party 
autonomy would be respected also from the European perspective. 
6. CONCLUSION  
Corporate Groups have become one of the most important economic operators. Its 
existence and legitimacy cannot be nor denied, neither ignored. As it was stated above, 
Corporate Groups cannot be considered automatically fraudulent or to act in abuse of 





The gap between reality and Law cannot continue. The first step to protect the interests 
involved in Corporate Groups is recognizing the reality. Turning the back to this reality, 
and applying ad hoc solutions does not provide a certain legal environment.  
In this way, Corporate Groups challenge to regulate harmonizing the different interests 
involved, in order to respond to the current reality of markets. In this sense, the legal 
plurality involved in this legal institution and the group’s purpose should be recognized 
by Law and protected. The needed regulation should be flexible enough to cover all the 
typologies of groups, and all the problems that arrive with their activities and 
relationships. This objective has been stated in the European Winter Report, although it 
has not been achieved yet.  
In this regulation, corporate governance of these economic operators should have a 
relevant space. Several issues concerning Corporate Groups are directly or indirectly 
connected with corporate governance.  
The soft Law usually used to regulate corporate governance has demonstrated to be 
insufficient to protect the interests involved, and in the case of Corporate Groups this 
interests are more diverse and complex to balance. Consequently, the soft Law should 
change into a mandatory regime. 
In this way, the proposed solution is regulating by principles, in a flexible and 
mandatory way. By a contract of group that would regulate the particularities of each 
group, but bound to the general principles. These principles should grant the necessary 
protection to all the parties involved in the activity of the Corporate Group. A complete 
regime of compensations, and liabilities should be established and be developed in each 
contract of group.  
The objective is to recognize and regulate Corporate Groups and their governance, 
protecting all the interested parties and the market, in an effective and safe way, that 
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